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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Aman Gas appeals from his judgment of conviction for battery with the intent to 
commit a serious felony, rape.  Mr. Gas was convicted following a jury trial and the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed.  Mr. Gas 
appeals and he asserts that the district court erred by instructing the jury on the offense 
of battery with the intent to commit rape, because that crime is not a lesser included 
offense of the charged crime in this case, which is rape committed where the victim is 
unconscious of the nature of the act. 
     
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On January 19, 2013, at approximately 5:00 pm, R.G. went to her friend Andrea’s 
house.  (Tr., p.331, Ls.2-7.)  Andrea’s mother, Monique, and roommate Adrian were 
also there.  (Tr., p.331, Ls.20-25.)  R.G. stayed at the house for about an hour and then 
contacted her friend, Abicheck Dwivedi (Adi), who picked her up.  (Tr., p.332, Ls.11-25.)  
She had consensual sex with Adi twice, and then he drove her home.  (Tr., p.333, 
Ls.11-23.)   
 R.G. returned to Andrea’s house at around 9:00, and by this time, Mr. Gas was 
also at the residence.  (Tr., p.334, Ls.1-7.)  She testified that she had been drinking Bud 
Light, some Coronas, and some shots of vodka with her friends.  (Tr., p.334, Ls.14-17.)   
 R.G. then testified that she fell asleep on the living room couch.  (Tr., p.335,  
Ls.1-2.) According to R.G.,  
I woke up to being messed with.  I didn’t really realize what was going on.  
I was still kind of in that drunken, dream state, I guess.  And I was being 
fingered in the butt at that point.  And didn’t really realize it, you know.  I’d 
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swung my arm out to kind of bat away.  I didn’t look or anything.  I was 
laying on my right side. 
 
(Tr., p.335, Ls.19-25.)  She also felt fingers in her mouth.  (Tr., p.415, Ls.15-17.)  She 
did not hit anything, “so I just thought I was dreaming and kind of rolled back over.”  
(Tr., p.336, Ls.19-21.)  Then according to R.G., she was “woken up by him actually 
trying to penetrate me.  But he did try about three times to get his penis into my butt.”  
(Tr., p.336, L.24 – p.337, L.1.)  She testified that this hurt and she woke up.  (Tr., p.337, 
Ls.8-9.)  During the time “between the fingering and the actual penetration” she felt her 
pants being pushed down.  (Tr., p.337, Ls.15-21.)   
 When R.G. awoke, she went to the bathroom and locked herself in.  (Tr., p.337, 
Ls.11-14.)  She noticed blood on the toilet paper after using it.  (Tr., p.338, Ls.18-22.)   
 Eventually, Andrea needed to use the bathroom, so R.G. let her in and then 
grabbed Andrea’s phone from her bedroom; after she went back to the bathroom she 
used Andrea’s phone to use Facebook to ask for help.  (Tr., p.339, Ls.2-22.)  These 
messages were time-stamped at 3:11 a.m. and 3:19 a.m.  (Tr., p.341, Ls.19-23.)  R.G. 
identified Mr. Gas as the suspect, stating, “when I turned around to tell him no, I had to 
go to the bathroom, I was able to look directly at him.”  (Tr., p.343, Ls.1-5.)   
 R.G. then left the house and walked down the street and got into Adi’s car; she 
had called him from the bathroom.  (Tr., p.347, Ls.10-22; p.345, Ls.2-19.)  Her father, 
who was already on the phone with the police, then arrived.  (Tr., p.348, Ls.3-8.)  She 
spoke to the police, and then went to the Portneuf Medical Center for an examination.  
(Tr., p.349, Ls.24-25.)   
 The nurse at the hospital testified that she noticed “some tearing of [R.G.’s] anus.  
I did document three separate tears, one of which appeared to go inside.”  (Tr., p.587, 
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Ls.5-9.)  The nurse also noted that R.G. indicated that the incident occurred between 
1:30 and 2:00 in the morning.  (Tr. p.629, Ls.14-15.)   
 Mr. Gas told the investigating officers that on the evening in question, he went to 
a bar called Hooligan’s at around 11:00 p.m. and returned to the residence at 
approximately 3:00 a.m.  (Tr., p.503, L.18 – p.504, L.11.)  He stated that he came in, 
saw R.G. asleep on the couch, and went to sleep on the couch.  (Tr., p.504, Ls.9-19.)  
He adamantly denied any contact with R.G. after he returned from the bar.  (Tr., p.504, 
Ls.18-23.)  Detective Tracy Marshall interviewed Mr. Gas.  Mr. Gas informed the 
detective that on the evening in question, [R.G.] was, 
coming onto him.  And when I asked him how he felt that she was doing 
that, he said that she hugged him approximately four or five times, which 
is unusual. She had never really done that to him in the past.   
 
He also said that at one point in time as he was sitting on the couch, she 
laid down on the couch kind of by him, and placed her head on his thigh 
and just laid there while watching a movie.  And at one point had reached 
up, had grabbed his hand and – as he described it, she was holding his 
hand and brought his hand down to like her chest. 
 
(Tr., p.685, L.21 – p.686, L.8.)  Mr. Gas also told the detective that he went to 
Hooligan’s and returned to the residence at around 3:00 a.m.  (Tr., p.688, Ls.16-21.)  
Detective Tracy took a “buccal swab”, which is a “swabbing of the inside of the cheeks 
that is used for comparison, DNA comparison.”  (Tr., p.692, Ls.17-24.)   
 Mr. Gas was then transported to the Portneuf Medical Center where he was 
examined by the sexual assault nurse examiner.  (Tr., p.747, Ls.13-25.)  She took 
samples from Mr. Gas’s mouth and penis and from under his fingernails.  (Tr., p.752, 
Ls.1-9.)   
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 Rylene Nowlin, a DNA analyst at the State lab, testified that she found DNA 
matching R.G.’s under Mr. Gas’s fingernails.  (Tr., p.863, Ls.11-25.)   She found DNA 
matching Adi’s but not Mr. Gas’s on R.G.’s vulva/vaginal swab.  (Tr., p.864, Ls.13-23.)  
She found that Mr. Gas and R.G. were potential contributors to the DNA on Mr. Gas’s 
penile swab.  (Tr., p.865, Ls.10-21.)  Ms. Nowlin did not test DNA from R.G.’s rectal 
swabs because the amount was insufficient for testing.  (Tr., p.866, Ls.12-19.)   
 Mr. Gas’s defense at trial was an alibi defense.  He pointed out that R.G. had told 
the nurse that the incident had occurred around 1:30 or 2:00 a.m., and that evidence 
established that Mr. Gas had been at Hooligan’s until 3:00 a.m.  (Tr., p.1164, Ls.1-6.)  
He also noted that at around 2:30 a.m., R.G. called Adi.  (Tr., p.1166, Ls.23-25.)  
Further, he asserted that despite the fact that several men were at the residence that 
evening, officers did not investigate anyone except Mr. Gas.  (Tr., p.1171, Ls.1-15.)  
Finally, he emphasized that a witness testified that, prior to him leaving for Hooligan’s, 
R.G. was flirtatious with Mr. Gas and was rubbing her skin on his body, clothes, and 
hands and that there could have been cross-contamination or transfer of DNA because, 
at the hospital, Mr. Gas was told to undress and take his hands and brush his body in 
an effort to get DNA.  (Tr., p.1173, L.12 – p.1174, L.25.)   
 Over Mr. Gas’s objection, the district court instructed the jury that if it found 
Mr. Gas not guilty of rape, it was to consider the crime of battery with the intent to 
commit rape.  (Tr., p.1127, Ls.4-12.)  Mr. Gas was convicted of battery with the intent to 
commit rape.  (R., p.560.)  Following his conviction, Mr. Gas filed a motion for a new 
trial on a number of issues, including the issue of instructing the jury on battery with the 
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intent to commit rape.  (R., pp.563, 596-98.)  The district court denied the motion.  
(R., p.1076.)   
 The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four year fixed, 
upon Mr. Gas.  (R., p.1142.)  He subsequently appealed.  (R., p.148.)  On appeal, he 
asserts that the district court erred by instructing the jury on battery with the intent to 
commit rape.   
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by instructing the jury on battery with the intent to commit rape? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury On Battery With The Intent To 
Commit Rape 
 
A. Introduction 
 
  Mr. Gas asserts that the district court erred by instructing the jury on battery with 
the intent to commit rape because it was not a lesser included offense of rape as it was 
charged in this case, and because the language of the jury instruction created a 
variance with the charging document. 
 
B. The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury On Battery With The Intent 
To Commit Rape 
 
Mr. Gas asserts that the district court erred in instructing the jury on battery with 
the intent to commit rape for two reasons: 1) it is not a lesser included offense of rape 
where the alleged victim is unconscious of the nature of the act; and 2) it created a 
variance between the charging document and the jury instruction. 
 
1. Lesser Included Offense 
The battery with the intent to commit rape instruction was proposed by the State 
as proposed instruction 22. (R., p.435.)  Mr. Gas objected to this instruction on the basis 
that there was no support in the law or in fact for the instruction and that it allowed the 
jury to consider other crimes as an alternative to the crime alleged.  (R., p.p.486-87.)  At 
the jury instruction conference, Mr. Gas objected to the battery with the intent to commit 
rape instruction because “evidence [has] come in that the act has been, according to 
[R.G.], allegedly completed, we do not have the lesser or included offenses because the 
act has been completed in one continuous event.”  (Tr., p.1103, Ls.4-8.)    
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In determining that the instruction was proper, the district court stated,  
In this particular case we have the testimony of the victim, the alleged 
victim, that Mr. Gas attempted to penetrate her on two occasions and then 
did penetrate her on one.  I don’t know what the jury’s going to find.  They 
get to decide what the facts are.  And so I think I have to instruct the jury 
on any set of facts that were present that could support the crimes to 
which they’re being instructed. 
 
And in this particular instance, they could say we don’t think there was 
penetration but there was an attempted penetration.  They could say we’re 
going to believe her on part of it and not believe her on part of it.  I don’t 
know what they’re going to find. 
 
(Tr., p.1126, Ls.11-23.)  Mr. Gas submits the district court erred because battery with 
the intent to commit rape is not a lesser included offense of rape where the alleged 
victim is unconscious of the nature of the act under either the statutory or pleading 
theory. 
“There are two theories under which a particular offense may be determined to 
be a lesser included offense of a charged offense.”  State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527 
(2011) (citing State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524 (1997)).  One theory is referred to as 
the “statutory theory.”  Id.  “Under this theory, one offense is not considered a lesser 
included of another unless it is necessarily so under the statutory definition of the 
crime.”  Id. (citing State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433 (1980)).  This Court applies 
the Blockburger test, which originated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 
(1932), to determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense under the statutory 
theory.  Id. (citing Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211 n.8 (1986).)  “An offense will be 
deemed to be a lesser included offense of another, greater offense, if all the elements 
required to sustain a conviction of the lesser included offense are included within the 
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elements needed to sustain a conviction of the greater offense.” Id. (citing State v. 
McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114 (1979)). 
In this case, rape is defined in relevant part as: 
the penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal or vaginal opening with 
the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female under any one (1) of 
the following circumstances: 
 
[…]  
 
(6) Where she is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act. As used 
in this section, “unconscious of the nature of the act” means incapable of 
resisting because the victim meets one (1) of the following conditions: 
 
(a) Was unconscious or asleep; 
 
(b) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act 
occurred. 
 
I.C. § 18-6101(6).  Battery with the intent to commit a serious felony is defined as, 
“Any battery committed with the intent to commit murder, rape, the infamous crime 
against nature, mayhem, robbery or lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor child …”  
I.C. § 18-911.  Under the statutory theory, this is not a lesser included offense of the 
crime of rape where the victim is unconscious of the nature of the act.   
 Rape, in this instance, requires only one act – penetration of the anal opening.  
Battery with the intent to commit rape requires a battery that is separate from the 
penetration; if penetration itself is considered the battery, then the defendant is guilty of 
rape, not battery with the intent to commit that rape.  Further, battery is defined as,  
(a) Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of 
another; or 
 
(b) Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another person 
against the will of the other; or 
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(c) Unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual. 
 
I.C § 18-903.  The crime of rape where the victim is alleged to be unconscious of the 
nature of the act does not require as an element the use of force or violence upon the 
person of another, the intentional and lawful striking or touching of another person 
against their will, or an act causing bodily harm to an individual; it requires only 
penetration.   
 The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the extrinsic definition of force with 
regard to forcible rape.  See State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412 (2013).  “Were we to 
construe ‘force’ as encompassing the act of penetration itself, it would effectively render 
the force element moot.  Force would always be present and never have to be proven, 
so long as there was sexual intercourse.”  Id. at 422.  “Thus, we conclude that some 
force beyond that which is inherent in the sexual act is required for a charge of forcible 
rape.”  Id.  Because “force” requires force beyond what is required for penetration, and 
rape where the victim is alleged to be unconscious of the nature of the act requires only 
penetration, it does not have as an element a battery by force.  There is also no 
requirement in this subsection of the rape statute requiring any use of violence.  There 
is also no requirement of any bodily harm.     
Finally, there is no requirement in the statute that penetration be against 
someone’s will.  Penetration must simply occur where the alleged victim is unconscious 
or asleep or was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.  
Thus, Mr. Gas submits that battery with intent to commit rape requires a battery 
separate from an act of penetration, and that, for purposes of this subsection of the rape 
statute, the statute does not require a battery.   
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Further, battery with the intent to commit rape is a specific intent crime.  See 
State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 646 (Ct. App. 2004).  It clearly requires that a battery be 
committed with the specific intent to commit rape.  Rape where the victim is alleged to 
be unconscious of the nature of the act is a general intent crime.   
The Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405 (1990), analyzed 
whether a specific intent was required under the Idaho rape statute.  The Supreme 
Court held in Stiffler that statutory rape was not a specific intent crime and thus 
reasonable mistake as to the victim’s age was not a defense. The Supreme Court 
reached this conclusion by analyzing the language of I.C. § 18-6101, which at the time 
stated: 
Rape defined. Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the 
oral, anal or vaginal opening with the perpetrator's penis accomplished 
with a female under either of the following circumstances: 
 
1. Where the female is under the age of eighteen (18) years. 
 
2. Where she is incapable, though any unsoundness of mind, whether 
temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent. 
 
3. Where she resists but her resistance is overcome by force or violence. 
 
4. Where she is prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and 
great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution; or by 
any intoxicating, narcotic, or anaesthetic substance administered by or 
with the privity of the accused. 
 
5. Where she is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, and this 
is known to the accused. 
 
6. Where she submits under the belief that the person committing the act is 
her is her husband, and the belief is induced by artifice, pretense or 
concealment practiced by the accused, with the intent to induce such 
belief. 
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See Id. at 407.  The Supreme Court concluded that the legislature, by including specific 
intent language in subsections (5) and (6), understood the difference between general 
criminal intent and specific intent and meant only to require specific intent in 
subsections (5) and (6).  Id. 
 However, the statute has since been amended in an important way.  The statute 
no longer requires that the accused know that the alleged victim is unconscious of the 
nature of the act.  See I.C. 18-6101(6). Thus, the specific intent language from this 
section of the statute has been removed.  Rape where the alleged victim is unconscious 
of the nature of the act is now a general intent crime.  See Stiffler, 117 Idaho at 407.  
Mr. Gas notes that the Court of Appeals has concluded that battery with the 
intent to commit rape is a lesser included offense of forcible rape.  See State v. Bolton, 
119 Idaho 846 (Ct. App. 1991).  Forcible rape is very different than rape where the 
alleged victim is unconscious of the nature of the act.  In addition to penetration, forcible 
rape requires resistance that is overcome by force or violence.  As noted above, the 
force must be extrinsic.  Thus, pursuant to the language of the statute, forcible rape 
requires both penetration and battery by the use of force.  Battery is, therefore, an 
element of forcible rape, where it is not in rape committed where the alleged victim is 
unconscious of the nature of the act.  Bolton does not contain any analysis regarding 
specific versus general intent.  Further, Bolton also considered whether the evidence at 
trial would support the determination of whether an offense was a lesser included 
offense, relying on State v. Boyenger, 95 Idaho 396 (1973).  Id. at 849.  Boyenger, 
however, was overruled by Curtis, 130 Idaho at 525 n.2.  Curtis makes clear that there 
are only two theories – the statutory and pleading theories.  Id. at 524.  There is no 
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theory that permits the court to rely on the evidence adduced at trial to determine 
whether an offense is a lesser included offense.  Thus, it was error for the district court 
to rely on the alleged victim’s testimony in determining that battery with the intent to 
commit rape was a lesser included offense in this case.1   
 “An offense will be deemed to be a lesser included offense of another, greater 
offense, if all the elements required to sustain a conviction of the lesser included offense 
are included within the elements needed to sustain a conviction of the greater offense.” 
State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114 (1979).  Because all of the elements of the 
lesser offense are not included in the greater offense, such as a battery and specific 
intent, battery with the intent to commit rape is not a lesser included offense of rape 
where the victim is unconscious of the nature of the act under the statutory theory.   
The other theory is called the “pleading theory.”  Flegel, 151 Idaho at 523.  (citing 
Curtis, 130 Idaho at 524).  “This theory holds ‘that an offense is an included offense if it 
is alleged in the information [or indictment] as a means or element of the commission of 
the higher offense.’”  Id. (citing Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211 (1986)).  Battery with 
the intent to commit rape is not the means by which Mr. Gas was alleged to have 
committed the crime of rape.  Mr. Gas was charged as follows:   
That the said AMAN FARAH GAS, County of Bannock, State of Idaho, on 
or about the 20th day of January, 2013, did penetrate with his penis the 
anal opening of a female person, [R.G.], who at the time was unconscious 
of the nature of the act and this was known to the defendant. 
 
                                            
1 Mr. Gas also notes that criminal jury instruction 970 states that battery with the intent 
to commit rape is lesser included offense of rape if all elements other than penetration 
are found.  I.C.J.I. 970.  This pattern instruction cites to Bolton.  As noted, forcible rape 
has different elements than rape where the alleged victim is unconscious of the nature 
of the act, and Mr. Gas asserts that Bolton does not control the instant case for that 
reason.  For the same reason, I.C.J.I. 970 does not control the outcome in this case.   
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(R., p.75.)  Mr. Gas acknowledges that the charging document does allege that 
committed rape with specific intent.  However, the charging document does not allege a 
battery separate from penetration.  As set forth above, battery with the intent to commit 
rape requires a battery separate from penetration.   The charging document alleges 
rape by penetration alone; there is no allegation of a separate battery.  Thus, under the 
pleading theory, battery with the intent to commit rape is not a lesser included offense in 
this case. 
   
 2. Variance 
 Mr. Gas further asserts that, if this Court were to find that battery with the intent 
to commit rape was a lesser included offense, the language of the instruction created a 
variance.  In addition to his objection to the instruction at trial, Mr. Gas asserted in his 
motion for a new trial that the instruction created a variance.  (R. pp.602-03.)  The 
existence of an impermissible variance between a charging instrument and the jury 
instructions is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.  State v. 
Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329 (Ct. App. 2001).  A determination of whether a variance is 
fatal depends on whether the basic functions of the pleading requirement have been 
met. Id. at 330 (citing State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417 (1985)). A charging 
instrument meets the basic functions of the pleading requirement if it fairly informs the 
defendant of the charges against which he or she must defend and enables him or her 
to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. Id. 
(citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 395 (1980)).  Therefore, a variance 
between a charging document and a jury instruction requires reversal only when it 
deprives the defendant of his or her right to fair notice or leaves him or her open to the 
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risk of double jeopardy.  Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18.  Thus, a variance between the 
facts alleged in the pleading instrument and the proof at trial generally will not be 
deemed fatal to the prosecutor’s case unless there has been such a variance as to 
affect the substantial rights of the accused.  Windsor, Id. at 417; State v. Colwell, 
124 Idaho 560, 566 (Ct. App. 1993).  A review of whether the defendant was deprived of 
his or her right to fair notice requires the court to determine whether the record suggests 
the possibility that the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or 
presentation of his or her defense.  Windsor, 110 Idaho at 418. 
 Jury instruction 16 defined battery with the intent to commit rape in this case.  
(R., p.514.)  As is relevant here, this jury instruction required the jury to find that 
Mr. Gas, “committed a battery upon [R.G.’ a female, and […] when committing such 
battery the defendant had the intent to use such force as was necessary to cause his 
penis to penetrate, however slightly, her anal opening, without her consent.”  
(R., p.514.)  Mr. Gas submits that this instruction create a variance with the charging 
document, which stated,  
That the said AMAN FARAH GAS, County of Bannock, State of Idaho, on 
or about the 20th day of January, 2013, did penetrate with his penis the 
anal opening of a female person, [R.G.], who at the time was unconscious 
of the nature of the act and this was known to the defendant. 
 
(R., p.75.)  Thus, the battery with the intent to commit rape instruction varied from the 
charging document in two respects: it 1) allowed the jury to convict Mr. Gas by 
committing a battery other than penetration; and 2) allowed the jury to convict Mr. Gas if 
this was done without R.G.’s consent, not where she was unconscious of the nature of 
the act.   
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In this case, the charging document did not put Mr. Gas on notice that he was 
required to defend against an act other than penetration or that the act was against 
R.G.’s consent.  Mr. Gas was on notice that he was required to defend against one act 
– penetration of the alleged victim’s anus.  He was not on notice that he was required to 
defend against any battery against the alleged victim.  Because the battery with intent to 
commit rape instruction allowed Mr. Gas to be convicted for an act that he was not 
charged with, he asserts that the instruction created a fatal variance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Gas requests that this conviction for battery with the intent to commit rape be 
vacated and his case remanded for further proceedings.   
 DATED this 20th day of May, 2016. 
 
      ________/s/_________________ 
      JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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